How accurate can 'geopolitics' concept apply on the relationship between America, China, Russia and Europe? Especially after Trump holds power, multilateral relation between Us, Europe, Asia and Middle East Countries becomes unstable and unpredictable. The South China Sea territorial disputes reveals the complexity It is disguised with the sovereignty declaration from China all over the spratlys islands, but in fact it is a world power competing ground.
FRANKFURT — Once, the merger of two iconic European companies might well have been derailed by regional political rivalries. But in the case of a deal between Siemens and Alstom, those concerns have receded in the face of a larger threat: China.
The proposed merger of Europe’s two largest train makers, one German and one French, demonstrated on Wednesday that economic imperatives are pushing the Continent together even as populist politicians try to pull it apart.
Siemens, a German electronics and engineering giant, and France’s Alstom, a maker of the high-speed TGV, said late Tuesday that they will merge their units that make trains,streetcars and signaling systems. The deal is backed by the French government, and the two companies provided details of the deal the following day.
The new company, to be called Siemens Alstom, is a response to intensifying competition from China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation, the state-backed train maker that has been winning contracts in the United States and emerging markets where mass transit is a fast-growing business.
The company’s success is emblematic of China’s increasing economic power, which, combined with a more isolationist American foreign policy, is forcing European leaders to violate old taboos in order to improve the functioning of the European Union and its economy.
“The message of this merger is that the European spirit is alive,” Joe Kaeser, the chief executive of Siemens, said at a news conference in Paris on Wednesday. “That’s a powerful message in times that are marked by populism and nationalism and social and political divides.”
The announcement comes just days after a far right party won seats in the German Parliament for the first time since World War II. On Tuesday, Emmanuel Macron, the French president, called for “the rebuilding of a sovereign, united and democratic Europe” that would include stronger border controls but also a European budget large enough to help countries in economic trouble.
Competition from China has already been a factor in other big European mergers. Last week, the German steel giant ThyssenKrupp said it would merge its European steel operations into a joint venture with Tata Steel. And last year, Nokia of Finland acquired Alcatel-Lucent, a French maker of telecommunications equipment, in part to address intense competition from China’s Huawei.
Other sectors, like shipbuilding or semiconductors, could also be ripe for mergers.
Mr. Macron has made competition from China a central focus of his European policy drive. This year, he proposed Europe-wide scrutiny of any new major stakes by Chinese companies in European industrial jewels, but was met with resistance by small countries like Greece and Hungary, which are eager for new investment.
The French president and other European leaders have grown increasingly alarmed that the E.U. is ceding control of advanced technology to China. In a recent speech in Athens, Mr. Macron called for strengthening the bloc into a “power that can face the U.S. and China.”
Those concerns deepened after a state-owned Chinese chemical company, ChemChina, bought the Swiss pesticides and seeds group Syngenta this summer for $43 billion. The Chinese state-backed shipping conglomerate Cosco recently took a majority stake in Greece’s Piraeus port to anchor China’s New Silk Road through Europe. Germany itself has been no stranger to takeover bids by Chinese state-backed firms.
Just weeks ago, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany tightened rules to limit takeovers of German strategic assets, a move aimed at Beijing.
Chinese competition was a driving factor in Mr. Macron’s backing to seal a deal between Alstom and Siemens, despite outcries from political opponents in France that he was handing over a French icon to the Germans.
“The big story here is the French willingness to let this happen,” said Mikko Huotari, director of the international relations program at the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin. “Alstom is one of the crown jewels of French industry.”
The Siemens-Alstom deal is in part a bid that being bigger may be a better way to counter China Railway Rolling Stock, known as CRRC, which has grown into the world’s largest and most competitive maker of railway equipment. The European company could yet grow further: Ahead of Tuesday’s announcement, there had been speculation that Siemens could link up with Bombardier of Canada. On Wednesday, Mr. Kaeser of Siemens did not rule out that Bombardier could later become part of the combined company.
Still, with sales of over $33 billion last year and 180,000 employees worldwide, CRRC is bigger than the train businesses of Siemens, Alstom and Bombardier combined.
Last year, the Chinese company secured contracts to build 64 subway cars for the city of São Paulo, and sold more than 800 railway cars to Chicago for $1.3 billion, winning the deal by submitting a cheap bid with good technology.
“Of course CRRC is extremely strong, and has changed a little bit the picture of the market,” Henri Poupart-Lafarge, the chief executive of Alstom, told reporters Wednesday.
Mr. Poupart-Lafarge will be chief executive of the new company, which will have its headquarters in Paris. The Mobility Solutions unit of Siemens Alstom, which provides systems to control rail traffic and is more profitable than the unit that makes trains and streetcars, will be based in Berlin.
The new company will have annual revenue of €15.3 billion, an order backlog valued at €61.2 billion and more than 62,000 employees worldwide.
Alstom in particular is a symbol of national technological might for the French, with high-speed TGV trains racing across the countryside, and Eurostar trains connecting Paris to London in just over two hours through the Eurotunnel.
While populist parties such as the National Front are hostile to closer political ties in the European Union, they are less likely to oppose corporate mergers that protect European companies from foreign competition.
Pro-European political leaders like Mr. Macron have themselves not been averse to government intervention to protect jobs at home.
Despite pledges to be less protectionist than his predecessors, Mr. Macron has shown a willingness to involve the state in industrial policy by getting involved in big deals. Last month, he temporarily nationalized one of France’s biggest shipyards, STX France, to prevent it from being taken over by an Italian competitor.
As France’s economy minister, he pushed through a government plan last year to order €630 million worth of new TGV trains — most of which were not calibrated to run on faster tracks — from an Alstom factory in the eastern town of Belfort to prevent hundreds of jobs there from moving to another plant.
The Alstom deal with Siemens also reflects, however, a willingness to be flexible to protect broader French interests.
On Tuesday, the country’s finance minister, Bruno Le Maire, said the French government welcomed the deal with Siemens, characterizing it as one that protected French jobs at Alstom.
Baker McKenzie advised the Chinese Nison Group on the acquisition of the majority stake of the German SieMatic Group, one of the globally leading manufacturers of kitchen furniture in the premium segment. Parties agreed not to disclose the purchase price.
The transaction is subject to regulatory approval and is expected to be completed in the fourth quarter of 2017.
Baker McKenzie advised Nison on all legal aspects of the deal. The transaction is structured as a share deal. A particular challenge of the legal advice was the handling of a challenging corporate legal structure of the SieMatic Group.
"For the Chinese Nison Group, SieMatic is a renowned partner for its planned growth on the Chinese market in premium kitchens. Our well-established China team has once again proved how our experience with Chinese transactions supports our clients in their strategic goals", commented Dr. Thomas Gilles, Corporate Partner and Head of the China Desk in Germany at Baker McKenzie.
The Nison Group is a family-owned company headquartered in Suzhou, China. The company was founded in 1994 and is active in the Real Estate and Premium Households business segments. The Nison Group is the leader in domestic appliances in China and unites the most recognized premium brands under one roof. The company has many years of experience with customers in China and Europe, generated sales of around 900 million US dollars in 2016 and employs more than 10,000 people.
SieMatic is one of the world's leading manufacturers of kitchen furniture in the premium segment. The family-run company was founded in Löhne, North Rhine-Westphalia in 1929 and is represented by subsidiaries and a network of sales partners and exclusive partnerships in more than 60 countries. SieMatic stands for quality and design, made in Germany and is one of the most popular luxury brands in the world.
Baker McKenzie regularly advises clients on cross-border transactions and reorganizations. Most recently the team advised Sulzer AG on the acquisition of the Transcodent Group, Tokheim Service Group on a strategic partnership with Kärcher, SPIE on its acquisition of LÜCK Group, Grünenthal on its acquisition of Adhesys Medical, Flowserve Corporation on the sale of Gestra-Gruppe, ZF Friedrichshafen AG on the sale of Cherry Group, the owners of Fragrance Resources on the sale of its fragrance business to International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., GFKL on the acquisition of Tesch Group, CORESTATE on its acquisition of Hannover Leasing, Heraeus Group on the sale of the global high-performance target materials business to the US-based Materion Group, MAGNA International on its acquisition of the Böddecker & Co. GmbH & Co. KG, Dassault Systèmes on the acquisition of the CST group, Sulzer on the takeover of the GEKA group from 3i, Deutsche Beteiligungs AG on its participation in Reinhold & Mahla-Group and RWE and E.ON on the sale of their shares in the Luxembourg energy supplier Enovos.
Legal Adviser Nison Group: Baker McKenzie Head of Corporate / M&A: Dr. Thomas Gilles (Partner, Frankfurt)
China’s new long-range maritime surveillance plane could cover all of S. China Sea: report
Source:Global Times Published: 2017/6/21 15:53:39
The first medium-to-long-range maritime-surveillance plane under the Chinese State Oceanic Administration has started operation at the South China Sea Branch of the government department.
The B-5002 plane, whose wingspan is about 30 meters, is the biggest and fastest maritime-monitoring plane in China. It also holds the record for the longest distance in flight among all Chinese maritime-monitoring planes, which theoretically could cover the whole South China Sea, China Ocean News reported Tuesday.
According to the report, the plane will perform monitoring tasks in a variety of areas including maritime environment protection, sea island exploitation and maritime rights maintenance as well as maritime research and rescue.
The aircraft's operation will effectively enlarge the scope of China's maritime and aviation law enforcement, promoting law enforcement in the South China Sea to a higher standard, the report said.
The plane is manufactured by the AVIC Xi'an Aircraft Industry (Group) Company LTD, modeled after the China-made Xinzhou-60 plane. It is equipped with some advanced hardware and software with a total value of nearly 100 million yuan ($14.6 million).
Cosco Pacific has entered into an agreement with Hutchison Port Holdings for the purchase of a 35 percent stake in the Euromax container terminal at Rotterdam (subject to regulatory approval).
Its investment totals to $140 million, and Cosco Pacific said that it chose to acquire a large stake based on long-term strategic trends: it expects Rotterdam to remain Europe's primary hub, and in addition, it is buying into what has historically been the main port for ship operating divisions of its parent company China Cosco Shipping (COSCOCS) for northwestern Europe.
“The Board expects Cosco Shipping to continue to deploy ULCVs to the European shipping route and call the Port of Rotterdam as its major hub in the region. The company’s investment in a container terminal in the Port of Rotterdam is not only in line with the company’s strategy of investing in overseas hubs, but also coordinates with Cosco Shipping ’s hub strategy,” the firm said.
Euromax is a modern, highly automated terminal, inaugurated in 2010. Its basin can accommodate drafts to 16 meters, and its cranes can reach to 23 rows across, giving it the ability to handle ULCVs. It has a design capacity of 2.5 million TEU per year, almost fully utilized in 2015, and it is expected to handle up to 3.2 million TEU per year after an expansion. The capacity adds roughly 10 percent to Cosco Pacific's current volume of 19 million TEU per year, the majority of it in China. Cosco Pacific also has plans to invest in a two thirds stake in the port of Piraeus, Cyprus; Bloomberg notes that Chinese firms like state-owned Cosco have been making larger foreign infrastructure investments in recent months, following President Xi Jinping's calls for a One Belt, One Road strategy boosting trade routes across the Indian Ocean, Central Asia and Europe.
Malaysian BRI Projects Well Underway Despite Environmental Concerns
Seen from the outset as a key partner in bringing China's Belt and Road Initiative to fruition, Malaysia has made clear progress with regard to a number of related infrastructure projects, despite some concerns about the consequences.
The Strait of Malacca: A vital channel for the success of the BRI.
When China's plans for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) were first unveiled, it was generally assumed that Malaysia would benefit substantially from the investments on offer and the likely co-operative opportunities. China is, after all, Malaysia's biggest export market and its most significant trading partner.
Given that Malaysia is one of the littoral states along the Strait of Malacca – one of the world's most important shipping routes – the country is seen as a valuable connector for China's broader infrastructure plans. In particular, it is a key component of the high-speed railway Beijing hopes will eventually run from Kunming down to Laos and Thailand, and then on to Malaysia and Singapore. Malaysia is also one of the most trade-dependent countries in the world, with trade accounting for 154% of the country's GDP.
To date, financing for the expansion of the country's ports and or the development of a number of industrial parks has already been put in place. The Kuantan Industrial Park in Pahang, the country's third largest state, for instance, has now been backed to the tune of RM5.6 billion (US$1.2 billion). This investment, some 40% of which has come from China, will be spent on the construction of a steel mill and a substantial upgrade to its port infrastructure.
Another major infrastructure project – Bandar Malaysia, a 197-hectare transport transit district – is now planned as one of the most ambitious developments in the greater Kuala Lumpur area. At present, construction is scheduled to begin this year, with completion due within 30 years. Once operational, it will be the main intercity link for all of the country's primary rail lines, while also offering access to 12 major highways.
Ultimately, the plan includes the construction of an underwater canal city, which would house a financial centre, cultural villages, lifestyle retail outlets, theme parks and gardens. The consortium handling the RM160 billion project is led by Iskandar Waterfront Holdings, one of Malaysia's leading developers, and CREC Malaysia, a subsidiary of the China Railway Group.
Commenting on the progress to date, Liang Haiming, Chief Economist at the China Silk Road iValley Research Institutein Beijing, said: "We have already established the China-Malaysia Port Cooperation Alliance, comprising 11 Chinese and six Malaysian ports. Work has also begun on the Strait of Malacca Maritime Industrial Park and a number of other projects. Given that the initiative wasn't proposed until 2013, the BRI has developed very quickly."
Despite the clear benefits on offer to Malaysia from the BRI, there have been some concerns about its wider implications, especially with regard to its consequences for the local environment. One particular flashpoint has been the Kuantan Industrial Park project, where open-pit mines are being used to extract bauxite destined for export to China.
According to reports in the local media, the mining has already caused extreme environmental damage and has seen a number of rivers in the immediate vicinity run red, while forests, plantations and orchards are also said to have been stripped bare. There are also suggestions that the air has become contaminated with radioactive dust, something that has poisoned and killed many of the durian trees for which the region is famous. This has led to a number of local farmers staging protests against the mine works.
Another major concern has been the amount of Chinese investment on offer and the terms on which it is being supplied. One body keen to regulate the country's financial dealings with the mainland has been the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), a political party that forms part of the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition.
Commenting on the arrangements currently in place, Datuk Seri Liow Tiong Lai, President of the MCA, said: "China is investing in our ports, railways and in the Kuantan Industrial Park. The cabinet has decided, however, that Chinese investors must use local materials and engage local industry players as a way of ensuring that we are driving our own economy forward."
There are also some concerns that inbound investment from China is still falling short of outbound investment to China. Highlighting this, Datuk Chua Tee Yong, Vice-president of the MCA and the country's Deputy International Trade and Industry Minister, said: "In 2015, Chinese companies invested RM10 billion into Malaysia. At the same time, though, Malaysian companies were investing RM30 billion into China."
Geoff de Freitas, Special Correspondent, Kuala Lumpur
Alle wegen leiden naar Peking - Een nieuwe zijderoute
Regeringsleiders en ministers van 130 Aziatische, Afrikaanse, Oost-Europese en Latijns-Amerikaanse landen komen zondag naar Peking voor de ’Eén Gordel, Eén Weg’-top. Op de agenda: het Chinese Marshallplan voor de wereld.
Oscar Garschagen (nrc) ; 12 mei 2017
De eerste goederentrein vanuit Londen komt op 29 april aan in Yiwu, China.
‘En dáár komt de snelweg van West-China naar Europa. Begin volgend jaar kan je van hier doorrijden naar Rotterdam, is maar 10.000 kilometer”, grijnst Guo Jianbin, de op een na hoogste partijfunctionaris in Horgos in de Chinese provincie Xinjiang. Hij wijst naar de eens lege steppewegen, waar nu het spoor naar Europa glanst in de middagzon, een nieuwe stad verrijst en industrieterreinen worden aangelegd.
All roads lead to Beijing - A new side route Heads of government and ministers of 130 Asian, African, East European and Latin American countries come to Beijing for Sunday's "One Gordel, One Way" Summit. On the agenda: the Chinese Marshall Plan for the world. Oscar Garschagen (nrc) ; May 12, 2017 The first freight train from London will be on April 29 in Yiwu, China. "And from there, we have this highway from western China to Europe. Beginning from next year, you can travel from here to Rotterdam, which is just 10,000 kilometers, " Guo Jianbin grins, the second-highest party official in Horgos in the Chinese Province Xinjiang. He points to the once empty steppes, where now the track heading to Europe, shining in the afternoon sun, a new city with rising status and there many industrial sites are being built.
Meer dan 2000 jaar geleden kampeerden hier, bij de oversteekplaatsen in de rivier de Ili, de karavanen van de Chinese en Arabische Zijderoute-handelaren. Al velen eeuwen geleden raakten de nederzettingen bedolven onder het zand. De enige kamelen zijn van koper en vormen samen met een paar herders een standbeeld in het zwaar bewaakte niemandsland tussen China en Kazachstan.
Een ijzeren muur van hekken, prikkeldraad en zwaarbewapende, ijskoud kijkende soldaten, scheidt hier Chinees Horgos van Kazachstaans Khorgos. Alleen in de afgeschermde zone, een bizarre gevangenis met tientallen winkelcentra waar het duurste bont, de nieuwste Gucci-tassen en Rolexen te koop zijn, kunnen Kazachen en Chinezen elkaar vrijelijk ontmoeten.
Horgos en Khorgos vormen samen een van de schakels in het nieuwe Chinese ‘Eén Gordel, Eén Weg’-project, het grootste ontwikkelingsprogramma in de economische geschiedenis van Azië en volgens sommige economen zelfs van de wereld (zie kader). Khorgos/Horgos heet een parel in die ‘gordel’ te zijn, want het is een van 900 projecten in Centraal- en Zuid-Azië, Afrika en Oost-Europa die door China worden gefinancierd en vaak ook worden gebouwd.
Over 2,000 years ago, at the crossing points in the Ili River, the caravans of Chinese and Arabian silk traders camped. Many centuries ago, the settlements were buried under the sand. The only camels are copper and, together with a few shepherds, form a statue in the heavily guarded no-man land between China and Kazakhstan. An iron wall of fences, barbed wire and heavily armed, ice-cold looking soldiers, separates Chinese Horgos from Kazakhstan Khorgos. Only in the sheltered zone, a bizarre prison with dozens of shopping centers where the most expensive fur, the latest Gucci bags and Rolexes are for sale, Kazakhs and Chinese can meet freely. Horgos and Khorgos together form one of the links in the new Chinese 'One Gordel, One Way' project, the largest development program in Asia's economic history and according to some economists even from the world (see box). Khorgos / Horgos is called a pearl because it is one of 900 projects in Central and South Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe, funded by China and often built.
Al meer dan 1.000 miljard dollar hebben Chinese ontwikkelings- en staatsbanken gereserveerd voor de modernisering van de infrastructuur in de noordelijke en zuidelijke buurlanden en in Afrika en het Midden-Oosten. Daarvan is in 2015 en 2016 al 90,4 miljard dollar uitgegeven aan de aanleg van spoorwegen, havens, kerncentrales, vliegvelden en olie- en gasleidingen.
Talrijke projecten, zoals de spoorlijn van China naar Laos, havens en een kerncentrale in Pakistan en de pijpleidingen van Kazachstan naar China zijn al in volle gang of opgeleverd.
Over 1,000 billion dollars have China spent on development and for state banks reserved for the modernization of infrastructure in the northern and southern neighbors, and in Africa and the Middle East. Among this, USD 90.4 billion was spent in the construction of railways, ports, nuclear power stations, airports and oil and gas pipelines in 2015 and 2016. Numerous projects, such as China's China to Laos, ports and a nuclear power plant in Pakistan, and the pipelines from Kazakhstan to China, have already been completed or completed. Marshallplan voor Azië
De Nederlandse ex-Wereldbank-econoom Louis Kuijs, werkzaam bij Oxford Economics in Hongkong, snapt goed waarom ‘Eén Gordel, Eén Weg’ het Chinese Marshallplan voor Azië wordt genoemd. „Het is zelfs vele malen groter dan het Marshallplan waarmee de VS na de oorlog Europa opbouwde. Het gaat zeker voor groei zorgen in ontwikkelingslanden als de projecten goed bestuurd worden”, denkt Kuijs, die al vele jaren in China werkt en het onderscheid kan maken tussen partijpropaganda en droge feiten.
Marshall plan for Asia
Dutch ex-World Bank economist Louis Kuijs, working at Oxford Economics in Hong Kong, finds out why 'One Gordel, One Way' is called the Chinese Marshall Plan for Asia. "It is even many times bigger than the Marshall plan with which the US built Europe after the war. It's definitely a matter of growth in developing countries if projects are well-managed, "Kuijs thinks, who has been working in China for many years and distinguished between party propaganda and dry facts.
Als het tempo van Guo Jianbin en zijn teams in Horgos maatgevend is, dan krijgen de Centraal- en Zuid-Aziatische economieën de komende tien jaar een zeer krachtig elixer toegediend. In amper drie jaar heeft Guo een stad gebouwd voor inmiddels 30.000 bouwvakkers, handelaren, vervoerders, partijbazen, politiemannen en soldaten en hun families. Over enkele jaren wonen „in het Chinese Dubai” 200.000 mensen.
Aan Chinese zijde van de grens rukken de asfalteerders van de zesbaanse weg naar Europa langzaam op en in de verte, in de provincie Almaty, naderen de Kazachstaanse wegwerkers met zware Chinese grondverzetmachines en vrachtwagens. Rechts glanst het spoor dat China verbindt met West-Europa (via Rusland) en het Midden-Oosten (via Iran naar Turkije) in de middagzon. Het Chinese Horgos dijt dagelijks uit met nieuwe appartementengebouwen, kantoren en hotels van glas en marmer. Op de industrieterreinen verrijzen de grootste robotfabrieken van het land; ruimte is, net als kapitaal, hier geen probleem. If the pace of Guo Jianbin and his teams in Horgos is remarkable, then the Central and South Asian economies will be given a very powerful elixir over the next ten years. In almost three years, Guo has built a city for now 30,000 construction workers, traders, carriers, party bosses, police officers and soldiers and their families. In a few years, "the Chinese Dubai" lives 200,000 people. On the Chinese side of the border, the asphalt road users of the six-way road to Europe slowly accelerate, and in the distance, in the province of Almaty, the Kazakhstan road workers are approaching heavy Chinese earth moving machines and lorries. On the right, China's railways connect with Western Europe (via Russia) and the Middle East (via Iran to Turkey) in the afternoon sun. The Chinese Horgos thrives daily with new apartment buildings, offices and hotels of glass and marble. At the industrial sites, the country's largest robotic factories rise; Space, like capital, is not a problem here.
Het Kazachstaanse Khorgos is nog niet meer dan een haveloos gehucht, maar beschikt inmiddels wel over een „droge haven” met opslagruimte voor 500.000 containers. De containers worden met reusachtige kranen overgeladen van Chinese wagons met een wielbreedte van 1435 millimeter op Russische wagons die 82 millimeter wijder zijn, een erfenis van de Sovjet-Unie.
Plannen voor een paardenracebaan, een winkel- en uitgaanscentrum en sportfaciliteiten bestaan alleen nog op hoogglanzend papier. Met de bouw van fabrieken op een 5000 hectare groot industrieterrein wordt binnenkort begonnen dankzij een investering van 5 miljard dollar van de Chinese provincie Hubei. De Chinese fabrieken die hier gaan produceren hoeven geen belastingen en geen importheffingen op bouwmaterialen te betalen en kunnen straks vrijelijk hun producten afzetten in de Euraziatische Douane Unie van president Poetin.
De internationale scepsis over ‘Eén Gordel, Eén Weg’ is snel aan het wegebben. Het besef dat het niet om Chinese „opiumdromen” gaat, zoals een Japanse commentator sneerde, is ook doorgedrongen tot de EU en de wereld van pensioenfondsen, verzekeringsbedrijven en investeringsfondsen. Nederlandse exportbedrijven zijn zeer geïnteresseerd geraakt.
Kazakhstan Khorgos is no more than a hazy hamlet, but now has a "dry harbor" with storage space for 500,000 containers. The containers are loaded with huge cranes of Chinese wagons with a wheel width of 1435 millimeters on Russian wagons that are 82 millimeters wider, a legacy of the Soviet Union. Plans for a horse race track, a shopping and entertainment center, and sports facilities only consist of high-gloss paper. Construction of factories on a 5000 hectare industrial site will start shortly due to a $ 5 billion investment from China's Hubei province. The Chinese factories that are going to produce here do not have to pay taxes and no import levies on building materials and can then freely ship their products into the Eurasian Customs Union of President Putin. The international skepticism about 'One Gordel, One Way' is coming soon. The realization that it is not about Chinese "opium dreams", as a Japanese commentator sneaked, has also penetrated the EU and the world of pension funds, insurance companies and investment funds. Dutch export companies have become very interested.
Hoog tijd voor een grote internationale bijeenkomst, moet president Xi Jinping, wiens staf de centrale leiding heeft over ‘Eén Gordel, Eén Weg’, gedacht hebben. Hij heeft alle deelnemende landen en internationale financiële instellingen uitgenodigd zondag in Peking bij elkaar te komen. En zij namen de uitnodiging graag aan, want anno 2017 leiden alle wegen naar Peking. Nederland is slechts op ambtelijk niveau present op de grootste topconferentie ooit gehouden in China. Dat heeft in China bevreemding gewekt.
„Wij willen letterlijk en figuurlijk alle stenen op de weg opruimen. Landen zouden zich niet moeten opstellen als de tolpoorten van de wereldeconomie”, oreert Guo (58). Hij trekt hard van leer tegen protectionisten en verdedigt de zegeningen van de wereldhandel, net als zijn hoogste baas Xi Jinping. De rolverwisseling van communist naar kapitalist gaat hem niet moeilijk af.
Of ik op de Europa-boulevard in Horgos de borders met rode en gele tulpen heb gezien, vraagt de communist die gekleed is in het bewust sobere tenue de ville (zwart jack, wit overhemd, zwarte broek) van een hoog geplaatste partijfunctionaris. „Tulpen groeien recht omhoog, met de bloem naar de zon en de hemel. Dat willen wij ook in economisch opzicht bereiken met het Gordel-en Weg-project”, zegt Guo gepassioneerd. Hij staat erop zijn „nieuwste bron van trots” te laten zien en snelt vooruit in zijn dienstauto, een zwarte Audi 6. Het blijkt om een kathedraal-hoog douanegebouw voor het toekomstige wegverkeer te gaan. Het is een roomkleurig gedrocht dat associaties oproept met Chinese paleizen en Egyptische piramides. In zekere zin staat het gebouw symbool voor China’s verstrekkende ambities.
High time for a major international meeting, President Xi Jinping must whose staff has the central leadership on "One Gordel, One Way", should have thought. He has invited all participating countries and international financial institutions to meet in Beijing on Sunday. And they gladly accepted the invitation because by 2017 all roads lead to Beijing. The Netherlands is present only at the official level at the biggest summit ever held in China. That has caused embarrassment in China. "We want to clear all the stones on the road literally and figuratively. Countries should not set themselves as the toll gates of the world economy, "oreert Guo (58). He draws hard from protection against protectionists and defends the blessings of world trade, like his highest boss Xi Jinping. The role of communist to capitalist does not make him difficult. Whether I have seen the borders with red and yellow tulips on the Europe Boulevard in Horgos, the Communist who is dressed in the consciously sober tenue asks the ville (black jacket, white shirt, black pants) from a high-ranking party official. "Tulips grow straight up, with the flower to the sun and the sky. We also want to achieve that in economic terms with the Belt and Road project, "Guo says passionately. He aims to show his "latest source of pride" and speeds forward in his service car, a black Audi 6. It appears to be a cathedral-high customs building for future road traffic. It is a cream-colored pattern that calls associations with Chinese palaces and Egyptian pyramids. In a sense, the building is a symbol of China's ambitious ambitions.
Ook politieke invloed
Xi Jinpings ‘Eén Gordel, Eén Weg’ is gebaseerd op de eenvoudige vaststelling dat het tijdperk van onstuimige groei in China zelf zijn einde nadert. Toekomstige groei moet komen uit nieuwe afzetgebieden voor de overvloed aan Chinese producten en technologieën (treinen, vliegtuigen, chips, robots, kerncentrales). Probleem voor China is dat in omringende Centraal-Aziatische en Zuid-Aziatische landen de infrastructuur onderontwikkeld is en deze ontwikkelingslanden niet in staat zijn zelf nieuwe netwerken te bouwen. Dat geldt ook voor Afrika.
„Door daar grootschalig te investeren creëert China groei. Ik moet zeggen dat de logica erg overtuigend is. We zien dat al gebeuren in Pakistan, waar China macro-economisch gezien goede resultaten boekt”, aldus econoom Louis Kuijs. Uiteraard kan er nog van alles misgaan, maar daar weten Chinese bestuurders na 35 jaar ontwikkeling van het moederland wel mee om te gaan, denkt hij.
Natuurlijk heeft China ook politieke oogmerken. Met de investeringen groeit de invloed van China in Azië en worden buurlanden in Chinese sferen gezogen. Ten koste van de VS, dat spreekt. De bedoeling van de grote top in Peking is de zorgen over oprijzend, assertief China weg te masseren, vooral bij de buurlanden met claims in de Zuid-Chinese Zee én bij Rusland.
Also political influence Xi Jinpings 'One Belt, One Way' is based on the simple finding that the era of turbulent growth in China itself is approaching its end. Future growth should come from new outlets for the abundance of Chinese products and technologies (trains, aircraft, chips, robots, nuclear power plants). Problem for China is that infrastructure in the surrounding Central Asian and South Asian countries is underdeveloped and these developing countries are unable to build new networks themselves. This also applies to Africa. "By investing heavily in investing China is growing. I have to say that the logic is very convincing. We see that already happening in Pakistan, where China is making macro-economic results, "said economist Louis Kuijs. Of course, everything can go wrong, but after that, Chinese executives know how to go about developing the mother country after 35 years, he thinks. Of course, China also has political objectives. With the investment, China's influence in Asia grows and neighboring countries are attracted to Chinese spheres. At the expense of the US, that speaks. The intention of the Beijing Summit is to worry about raising China's massive assertive, especially in neighboring countries with claims in the South China Sea and Russia.
Uitgekeken wordt naar de reactie van de Russische leider Poetin, die heeft moeten toezien hoe China inmiddels de grootste investeerder is geworden in Centraal-Azië, zijn achtertuin. Veel weerwerk kan Poetin, die over een zwaar verzwakte economie gaat, Xi trouwens niet bieden.
De Chinese investeringen in de noordelijke buurlanden hebben niet alleen economische oogmerken. In ruil verwacht China, behalve grote orders voor Chinese bouwbedrijven, ook actieve hulp bij het bestrijden van terrorisme.
China is bevreesd voor de terugkeer van Oeigoerse, Kazachstaanse en Kirgizische IS-jihadisten uit het Midden-Oosten naar Xinjiang. De provincie beslaat eenvijfde van Chinees grondgebied en is inmiddels omgebouwd tot een fort met duizenden checkpoints en militaire kampementen. Op het dak van een vijfsterrenhotel in aanbouw in Horgos staan zelfs sluipschutters. Het paspoort van een West-Europese bezoeker wordt veelvuldig en argwanend bestudeerd en de stempels worden op echtheid bevingerd. Vrij reizen is zeker voor niet-Han-Chinezen onmogelijk geworden.
Looking forward to the response of Russian leader Putin, who has had to watch how China has become the biggest investor in Central Asia, now its backyard. In fact, much weather, Putin, who is in a heavily weakened economy, can not offer Xi.
Chinese investment in the northern neighbors not only has economic objectives. In return, China, in addition to major orders for Chinese construction companies, also expects active aid in combating terrorism.
China is afraid of returning from the Middle East, Uzbek, Kazakh and Kyrgyz Islamic jihadists to Xinjiang. The province occupies one fifth of Chinese territory and has now been transformed into a fort with thousands of checkpoints and military camps. On the roof of a 5-star hotel under construction in Horgos there are even snipers. The passport of a Western European visitor is studied extensively and suspiciously and the stamps are enforced. Free travel has certainly become impossible for non-Han-Chinese.
„De situatie in Xinjiang is gespannen en wij willen iedereen een gevoel van veiligheid geven”, erkent partijbaas Guo. Hij weet dat er geen Chinese investeerder zijn kant uit komt als er niet op iedere hoek een politiepost staat en het leger niet zichtbaar patrouilleert, dag en nacht.
De lokale bevolking behoort tot de Oeigoerse minderheid die door de Han-Chinezen na een grote reeks aanslagen diep wordt gewantrouwd. De islamitische Oeigoeren mogen hier geen lange baarden dragen; sluiers, hoofddoeken en nikabs zijn streng verboden. Bij iedere moskee staat politie. Oeigoeren die zich niet aan de kledingvoorschriften houden, wacht verbanning uit de regio of, erger nog, de gevangenis.
Aan de Kazachstaanse zijde van de grens, bereikbaar na vijf uur wachten op de terugkeer van lunchende douaniers, zijn het juist de Chinezen die zorgen baren. „Zij lachen vriendelijk naar je, terwijl ze tegelijkertijd je baan stelen”, zegt Nusel Zhanat, uitbaatster van een hotelletje in Zharkent. Het stadje, op veertig kilometer van de grens, is blijven steken in de tijd van de Sovjet-Unie, zo slecht zijn de wegen, zo sjofel zijn de mensen gekleed. Zeker vergeleken met modern China. Drie avontuurlijke studenten uit Peking die naar Moskou liften, worden door haar hoogst onbeschoft behandeld.
Bij Khorgos Gateway, het bedrijf dat de containers van oost naar west en omgekeerd overlaadt, hoeven Chinese investeerders daar niet bang voor te zijn. „Wij rollen de rode loper voor hen uit, zij zijn zeer welkom, wij hebben hen hard nodig voor de ontwikkeling van onze speciale economische zone”, zegt Asset Seisenbeck, commercieel directeur, die na zijn studietijd (financiële economie) in Shanghai, vloeiend Chinees spreekt.
"The situation in Xinjiang is tense and we want to give everyone a sense of security," acknowledges party boss Guo. He knows there is no Chinese investor's side if there is no police station at all, and the army does not patronize the day and night.
The local population belongs to the Ugandan minority who is deeply accustomed to the Han-Chinese by a large series of attacks. The Islamic Uighurs may not carry long bears here; Veils, headsets and nikabs are strictly forbidden. At every mosque is a police station. Owigans who do not comply with the clothing regulations are waiting for a ban from the region or, worse still, the prison.
On the Kazakhstan side of the border, reachable after five o'clock waiting for the return of lunchtime customs, it is precisely the Chinese who take care. "They smile kindly to you while stealing your job at the same time," said Nusel Zhanat, a builder of a hotel in Zharkent. The town, about forty kilometers from the border, has been stuck in the time of the Soviet Union, so bad are the roads, so shabby are the people dressed. Certainly compared to modern China. Three adventurous students from Beijing who travel to Moscow are treated very rude by her.
At Khorgos Gateway, the company that overloads the containers from east to west and vice versa, Chinese investors do not need to be afraid. "We roll out the red carpet for them, they are very welcome, we need them hard for the development of our special economic zone," says Asset Seisenbeck, commercial director, who, after studying in Shanghai's financial economics, fluent Chinese Speaks.
Leave ‘Feng Shui’ to the Chinese, Taoist Priest Tells U.S. Official
May 21, 2015 3:22 pm HKT
A Taoist priest is refuting a U.S. official’s understanding of the concept “feng shui,” a whimsical twist to Sino-U.S. relations amid an increasingly tense row over sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.
Last week, Daniel Russel, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asia, told the Washington Post: “Reclamation isn’t necessarily a violation of international law, but it’s certainly violating the harmony, the feng shui, of Southeast Asia, and it’s certainly violating China’s claim to be a good neighbor and a benign and non-threatening power.”
Now, Taoist priest Liang Xingyang is rebutting the U.S. official’s understanding of “feng shui.” The term, which translates directly as “wind water,” refers to the Chinese philosophical system of harmonizing the human being with his surrounding environment. In fact, claims Mr. Liang, China’s reclamation efforts are improving the region’s feng shui.
Mr. Liang is the secretary general of a Taoism association in the central city of Xi’an.
China makes claims to almost all of the South China Sea and evidence continues to emerge showing massive construction of military-like facilities, including a runway, above one section of reef.
Mr. Russel’s feng shui comment marks a lighter take from a U.S. official that Chinese activities are unnecessarily raising tensions in the region. Chinese building is unsettling both to the U.S. — which actively patrols the South China Sea’s busy shipping lanes – as well as to China’s neighbors making competing territorial claims, including Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and the Philippines.
The China effect in anxious Europe
Gungwu Wang
Received: 10 July 2012 / Accepted: 16 July 2012 /
Published online: 1 August 2012 # Springer-Verlag 2012
Abstract The world economy is going through a testing time and Europe’s concerns
are understandable. Much attention has been focused on the rise of Asia, especially the
economic performance of China during the past decades. There seems to be anxiety
about the loss of economic dynamism in the West when compared with the growing
confidence in Asia. This essay surveys some of the reasons for anxiety, from those that
are common to the global economy to those that arise specifically from the problem of
China. It identifies the source as the perceived power shifts in the Pacific and Indian
oceans that affect American interests and indirectly those of Europe. While future
generations of Europeans need to know Asia better, this is no different from the need
for Asians to understand the West, something Asians have been trying to do for over a
century. There is no reason why Europeans cannot do that quickly and well.
The need to know more about rising Asia in Europe is obvious when considering the
concerns of young Europeans preparing themselves to work and compete in a
globalized market. But, if it is to match what the best-educated Asians know about
Europe, the slope will be steep and great efforts will be needed. What makes it more
difficult is the fact that Asia seems to be rising by having learnt a great deal from
Europe and America. It may, therefore, appear that this new Asia will be easy to
understand. That is deceptive. It is true that Asia has modeled much of their
industrializing economies on Western experience and will continue to depend on
the creativity of Euro-American science and technology. But it needs close study and
cultural empathy for Europeans to appreciate the social and political structures that
have both helped and hindered the modernization processes in Asia today.
This lecture is delivered at the University of Copenhagen on 2 May 2012.
G. Wang (*)
National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
e-mail: eaiwgw@nus.edu.sg
G. Wang
East Asian Institute, NUS Campus, Tower Block #06-01, Singapore 259770, Singapore
336 G. Wang
There are many varieties of Asian responses, many kinds of successes and failures.
Earlier speakers have alluded to them and it is clear that the various responses need to
be distinguished. Thus, while recognizing that there are areas in Asia that are
comparable, I shall only look at China here.
As a historian, I am constantly reminded that young Chinese at the start of the
twentieth century were terribly anxious when they found that the European Great
Powers were miles ahead of them in almost every field of development and realized
that they had a long way to go to catch up. Many panicked and sought to revive the
country in drastic ways, through rebellion, revolution, and even the total rejection of
their own past. Compared to that response, Europe’s awareness of what Asia is
seeking to achieve is timely and, it seems to me, the remedies are much simpler
and decidedly doable. Some might think that Europe has been too self-centered and
that an enlightened response has been too slow in coming. But, given the many bells
that are ringing today, there is really no reason why the next generation of Europeans
will not be able to overcome the challenge of Asia’s relative rise.
I must admit that the idea that an erstwhile dominant Europe might be anxious today is
more interesting than the story of China rising after long periods of disorder and
uncertainty. Should Europe be anxious? Where does such anxiety come from? Many
writers have touched on the changing relativities in global affairs, but why should that lead
to anxiety? And how do these questions relate to China? Let me say straightaway that I am
puzzled why European anxieties should have anything to do with rising Asia. I am even
more skeptical of the exaggerated accounts of what rising China can do to the world.
Nevertheless, I am aware that there is a China effect in global perceptions today, and rising
China is the source of anxiety in some places, for example, among some of China’s
immediate neighbors and even among some groups in the USA as a Pacific power. Of
course, it is not China alone that is rising. But, reading the discourse between the lines,
much of the ongoing discussion about rising Asia is really about China’s remarkable
development during the past three decades. Somehow, the rise of other countries could
actually be welcome, but it is China’s rise that has become the cause for anxiety.
The idea that Europe may be anxious is indeed intriguing. Looking over its recent
history, I would have thought that Europe could not have been more anxious than when,
after the Second World War, most of the continent was devastated by destruction and loss
of life. And, when its imperial states had to withdraw from their colonies in Asia and
Africa to become mere nation-states, the decline from their previous positions of power
and wealth must have been painful. Europe’s dominant place in the world was replaced by
two upstart superpowers, the USA west across the Atlantic and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) overland to the east. During their so-called Cold War,
Western Europe was forced to lean towards the USA while the eastern half of the continent
had little choice but go with the USSR. Major decisions in global affairs were no longer in
European hands. Under those circumstances, the leaders of each of the European states
would have had good reason to be anxious about their respective country’s future. But, as
I understand it, they seemed not to have been, at least not for long.
The continent recovered well from the damage done by the war, especially its
Western half. European leaders were bold and innovative in creating a larger regional
community, something few thought much of when it was first mooted. Today, that
community is moving towards a potentially powerful union. Who in 1945 would
have thought that this could be done? Living standards among Europeans soon
The China effect in anxious Europe 337
became among the highest in the world and the quality of life of those who are
employed has been the envy of just about everyone. It was breathtaking what the old
nation-states of Europe have been experimenting with. Today, the EU model has
gained well-deserved attention, not least among the national leaders in Southeast Asia
who are trying to establish a strong regional Association of Southeast Asian States.
In short, what anxiety there was quickly turned to pride and renewed confidence.
How Europe recovered was remarkable. And, after the Cold War was over and the
West was triumphant, the promised golden era of capitalism seemed to have arrived.
The economies of both Europe and America grew at a great pace and their growth
was stopped only by the dramatic downturn of late 2008 in New York and then by the
crisis of the Euro in 2011. Does this mean that anxious Europe is something that is
only a few years old? Is this something temporary or is there a feeling that this
stoppage portends more fundamental shifts in global power and wealth?
One might ask, what is really new? The following three factors in global affairs
loom large. New technologies have speeded up the rate of change and information
dissemination. This creates great volatility in markets and public opinion that is
difficult to predict or control. Can older political structures cope with such changes?
Secondly, the modern post-Enlightenment faith in continuous economic growth
and having a larger pie fairly shared among the needy has been undermined. Will a
minority of the rich get richer and most other people poorer? Is the mixed economy
model that Europe had pioneered now seriously threatened? Will the majority now
want a total overhaul of the social and political system?
Thirdly, the hope that the USA as the sole superpower since the 1990s might make
the world a better and safer place can no longer be taken for granted. In particular,
some problems in Asia are not amenable to American solutions; some might even
become potential challenges to American supremacy. This is certainly something for
the USA to be concerned about. But, should Europe be anxious about American
reactions to changes in the Asia-Pacific region?
The first two factors affect every corner of the world. They are not the sources of the
China effect and do not have a direct bearing on what China is doing. Indeed, China
faces even more difficult problems than Europe, for example, the spread of the latest
communications technologies, and the innovative ways its people are making use of
them, have increasingly taxed the Chinese state’s resources. Also, the growing tensions
between the nouveau riche and the struggling poor in China are endangering social
stability. In comparison, such tensions in Europe look manageable. It also cannot be
shown that China is in any way rising at the expense of Europe. I am thus led to conclude
that neither of the two factors is significant as a source for European anxiety.
There is, however, one area that may be arousing some concern. This can be found
in the zero-sum framework that pervades the study of political and military power.
Here, relativities do matter a great deal. In that framework, American reactions to
China’s rise can be globally significant. If the mood in the USA should reach the
point when the majority feels that the country faces relative decline, and this is
matched by the expectation that China will become the superpower to challenge
US supremacy, there would be reason for Americans to be anxious. That could then
be a factor relevant to current debates about an anxious Europe.
It is remarkable how, during the past half century, European attitudes have come to
be seen as paralleling those in the USA. The European and American economies have
338 G. Wang
done very well together. This includes the financial and service sectors where parts of
Europe have sought to follow American practices and policies. It partly explains how
the financial crisis that began in the USA in late 2008 directly affected most countries
in Europe. Overnight, both sides of the Atlantic seem to have felt the same pain,
although some countries felt it more immediately than others.
For me, this shows how closely much of Europe is now integrated with the USA. It
is particularly apparent in the areas of defense and security where American protec-
tion, originally against the Soviet Union through North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and other institutions, had become the norm. Even though there are people in Europe
who rail against this dependence, that high degree of integration is manifest on the
ground and in the air. For example, in 2011, the Europeans might not have acted as
one when Britain and France actively intervened in Libya, but the reassuring shadow
of USA backing was always crucial. And the same applies to many of the decisions
pertaining to the Middle East where Europeans have been America’s indispensable
allies. They seem to share the same anxiety when faced with a region that, unlike the
last two centuries, now defiantly resists Western influence.
In economic and social areas, integration may be less obvious. There are residual
ideological differences about welfare provisions and the role of the public sector. But
Europeans have important shared philosophical and cultural values with Americans that
impinge on European lives and guide their habits of thought. Europe may still look older
and wiser but, after decades of dependence on American support, the majority of its
peoples would not want to do without American protection and leadership. In that
context, it is easy to understand why increasingly most Europeans are quick to respond
as Americans do. Thus, if the Americans are anxious about China rising and, therefore,
decide to shift their defense focus to the Asia-Pacific, one can expect many Europeans to
feel a similar concern. Some might even feel that, if this causes a slippage in American
care and attention, there is even more reason to be anxious.
In short, European anxiety has little to do with Europe’s own relations with China.
However, the close Europe–USA relationship suggests that, for the source of
Europe’s anxiety, one has to take USA thinking about China into consideration.
But as we are not gathered here to talk about the USA, I shall leave aside for another
time the question of why the USA should worry about China.
Let me now turn to the China effect. In 2004, I published a paper describing the
present phenomenon as the fourth rise of China. I identified the first as the Qin–Han
unification 2,000 years ago, the second as the emergence of the Tang dynasty in the
seventh century and the third after the Ming Chinese recovered from Mongol
conquest at the end of the fourteenth century. The fourth rise at the end of the
twentieth century had one thing in common with the others. It came after China
had been overwhelmed by massive changes to state and society.
This rise has been a long time coming and is at the heart of the story of modern China.
All the facts are well known, but the wider context in Asia deserves a closer look. Since
the end of the Second World War in 1945, many leaders of former colonies were cheered
that their countries were decolonized, but they shared some of the anxieties felt by
Europeans when their new states were also expected to choose between two super-
powers, the USA and the Soviet Union. One European scholar known for his Marxist
views who understood modern European history very well was the Dutch historian, Jan
Romein. His book, first published in 1956, on the century of Asian history was not
The China effect in anxious Europe 339
flattering to Asian institutions but it was one of the first to alert Europeans to the
potential of countries that were newly free from foreign rule. One of his students was
a friend and he confirmed that Jan Romein was not anxious about Asia rising but more
about Europe recovering from its many wars. Reading his and other European reports
about developments in Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, there was no reason to expect Asia
to rise and be a source of concern. However, after experiencing decades of turmoil, the
world today is no longer surprised that Asia is rising and that China is leading the way.
We should not be surprised about China’s capacity to rise. Its island neighbor,
Japan, a country that has mastered what a powerful imperial China had to offer,
turned away from Chinese civilization when it discovered that Europe was stronger
and richer. That led to its spectacular rise at the end of the nineteenth century. Despite
the big dip between the 1940s and 1950s as a consequence of the Pacific War, Japan
has been rising ever since. Clearly, that rise had been a real source of anxiety for all
other Powers. Indeed, it led Japan quickly to war, first with China and Russia, and
then again with China until it attacked the USA and its European allies in 1941.
Recalling those episodes today has made many strategic thinkers pause. It is unlikely
to lead Japan to war again because lessons have been painfully learnt, although there are
some who would not altogether rule out that possibility. But what about China? Here we
come to the nub of the current manifestations of anxiety. The idea that China has the
capacity to rise to the same heights as imperial Japan does exercise the minds of many
American strategists. America’s allies located closer to China are also troubled and,
apart from those with their own political agendas, some of them are even encouraged by
their American friends to worry even more. And there is evidence that many Europeans,
for various different reasons, share some of that anxiety.
This has much to do with the speed of Chinese development, with how surprised
most people are by the Chinese Communist Party leaders’ ability to adapt their
centralist political structures to capitalist methods of economic growth. Until the very
end of the twentieth century, few would have expected China to rise so quickly. After
all, China was for more than a century divided by rebellions, invasions, civil wars,
and revolutions. At several points before 1945, many in China thought the country
was mortally weakened and its ancient civilization totally submerged.
When the People’s Republic was established over 60 years ago, it turned to the
Soviet Union for help and was expected to remain a satellite of the Soviet empire.
Because of that, Maoist China was seen as dangerous to the interests of the USA and
its allies. But when Mao Zedong spun off his own brand of revolutionary zeal, it
actually provided the wedge that ultimately helped the USA to undermine the larger
Soviet threat. When Mao died, most people were grateful that Deng Xiaoping closed
that book and opened another, one that concentrated on creating a peaceful environ-
ment for economic development. In this new book, China opened its doors to the
global market and learnt directly from America and Europe, as well as from its
immediate East Asian neighbours. The successes are now obvious. Both the Chinese
peoples and consumers of manufactured goods everywhere have benefited from that
rapid growth. Can this China effect, product of an extraordinary success story, be the
source of anxiety among Americans, Europeans and China’s neighbours?
The sources are indeed complex. On the surface, the 2008 recession in the USA
and Europe has highlighted the fact that China, and some other parts of Asia,
weathered that shock well. China’s economy continued to grow and the idea that this
340 G. Wang
kind of state-driven resilience can successfully withstand the uncertainties of the
capitalist system has attracted a great deal of attention. In particular, some of those
countries that have been trying to follow different European models of development
are thinking again. How exactly will China’s success impact on the ideals of
economic liberalization and the virtues of private enterprise? The question is no
longer academic but has become a subject of practical interest.
The China effect also takes other forms, mostly not of China’s doing. When the
Euro countries encountered a series of interconnected problems that look intractable,
there followed many stories of European countries looking to China for help. Justified
or not, such stories can only be misleading. China is in no position to help the
developed countries of Europe, but starring in so many headlines and feature articles
in the international and national media has contributed greatly to raising false hopes
and generating anxiety. That has certainly raised concerns about how China will
wield its newfound economic influence.
At another level, debates within China have added another dimension to the China
effect. This has come largely from recent US strategic decisions in West and Central Asia.
As a result of failures there, the follow-up decisions about moving America’s strategic
focus to Northeast and Southeast Asia, and the Pacific region in general, has opened up
new debates in China. At their heart is the question of how China should respond to this
open and deliberate shift of attention. In particular, the calls for a reappraisal of Deng
Xiaoping’s injunction to concentrate on China’s own economic development and not to
engage actively in foreign adventures have become louder. In that context, the steady
growth in military expenditures and more strident voices in the blogosphere, with the
People’s Liberation Army seeking a bigger role in national politics, have all aroused
intense attention. But is China’s response the cause for anxiety? Or does the anxiety come
mainly from those who hoped that the USA would always be the sole superpower
dedicated to moving the world towards its version of modern civilization?
I cannot close without at least mentioning that the Chinese people have reason to
be anxious too. It might be relevant, possibly even useful, for young Europeans to
find out what worries their counterparts in China. Of course, the scale is different. It is
not only the numbers of people involved. There are also the complexities of a highly
centralized system that is also necessarily decentralized in order to produce the
growth it has achieved. How will such a system cope with the pressures coming
from its very successes? Given the range of discrepancies that mark the distribution of
wealth and power in China, what can the young hope for? Their fathers and grand-
fathers learnt a lot from the West. Should they also go on doing the same for the rest
of the 21st century? But, if Europe is anxious, where can they turn?
Many Chinese intellectual leaders are now asking that the country look to its own
cultural roots to find the moral compass that many young people today find missing
from their lives. Some have pointed to the fact that the young in Europe are anchored
by their faith in the fundamental values that had made Europe great. That is a very
important lesson for China today. As long as the Chinese people still have faith in
their history and culture, any kind of anxiety becomes manageable. If young Chinese
can recover the inner force that had propelled their earlier leaders to rebuild China
from the ruins of wars and invasions, that is the China effect that deserves more
attention from young Europeans. Perhaps they could then be convinced that there is
no reason for them to be anxious at all.
