The China effect in anxious Europe
Gungwu Wang
Received: 10 July 2012 / Accepted: 16 July 2012 / Published online: 1 August 2012
# Springer-Verlag 2012
Abstract The world economy is going through a testing time and Europe’s concerns are understandable. Much attention has been focused on the rise of Asia, especially the economic performance of China during the past decades. There seems to be anxiety about the loss of economic dynamism in the West when compared with the growing confidence in Asia. This essay surveys some of the reasons for anxiety, from those that are common to the global economy to those that arise specifically from the problem of China. It identifies the source as the perceived power shifts in the Pacific and Indian oceans that affect American interests and indirectly those of Europe. While future generations of Europeans need to know Asia better, this is no different from the need for Asians to understand the West, something Asians have been trying to do for over a century. There is no reason why Europeans cannot do that quickly and well.
The need to know more about rising Asia in Europe is obvious when considering the concerns of young Europeans preparing themselves to work and compete in a globalized market. But, if it is to match what the best-educated Asians know about Europe, the slope will be steep and great efforts will be needed. What makes it more difficult is the fact that Asia seems to be rising by having learnt a great deal from Europe and America. It may, therefore, appear that this new Asia will be easy to understand. That is deceptive. It is true that Asia has modeled much of their industrializing economies on Western experience and will continue to depend on the creativity of Euro-American science and technology. But it needs close study and cultural empathy for Europeans to appreciate the social and political structures that have both helped and hindered the modernization processes in Asia today.
This lecture is delivered at the University of Copenhagen on 2 May 2012.
G. Wang (*)
National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: eaiwgw@nus.edu.sg
G. Wang
East Asian Institute, NUS Campus, Tower Block #06-01, Singapore 259770, Singapore
Received: 10 July 2012 / Accepted: 16 July 2012 / Published online: 1 August 2012
# Springer-Verlag 2012
Abstract The world economy is going through a testing time and Europe’s concerns are understandable. Much attention has been focused on the rise of Asia, especially the economic performance of China during the past decades. There seems to be anxiety about the loss of economic dynamism in the West when compared with the growing confidence in Asia. This essay surveys some of the reasons for anxiety, from those that are common to the global economy to those that arise specifically from the problem of China. It identifies the source as the perceived power shifts in the Pacific and Indian oceans that affect American interests and indirectly those of Europe. While future generations of Europeans need to know Asia better, this is no different from the need for Asians to understand the West, something Asians have been trying to do for over a century. There is no reason why Europeans cannot do that quickly and well.
The need to know more about rising Asia in Europe is obvious when considering the concerns of young Europeans preparing themselves to work and compete in a globalized market. But, if it is to match what the best-educated Asians know about Europe, the slope will be steep and great efforts will be needed. What makes it more difficult is the fact that Asia seems to be rising by having learnt a great deal from Europe and America. It may, therefore, appear that this new Asia will be easy to understand. That is deceptive. It is true that Asia has modeled much of their industrializing economies on Western experience and will continue to depend on the creativity of Euro-American science and technology. But it needs close study and cultural empathy for Europeans to appreciate the social and political structures that have both helped and hindered the modernization processes in Asia today.
This lecture is delivered at the University of Copenhagen on 2 May 2012.
G. Wang (*)
National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: eaiwgw@nus.edu.sg
G. Wang
East Asian Institute, NUS Campus, Tower Block #06-01, Singapore 259770, Singapore
336 G. Wang
There are many varieties of Asian responses, many kinds of successes and failures.
Earlier speakers have alluded to them and it is clear that the various responses need to
be distinguished. Thus, while recognizing that there are areas in Asia that are
comparable, I shall only look at China here.
As a historian, I am constantly reminded that young Chinese at the start of the twentieth century were terribly anxious when they found that the European Great Powers were miles ahead of them in almost every field of development and realized that they had a long way to go to catch up. Many panicked and sought to revive the country in drastic ways, through rebellion, revolution, and even the total rejection of their own past. Compared to that response, Europe’s awareness of what Asia is seeking to achieve is timely and, it seems to me, the remedies are much simpler and decidedly doable. Some might think that Europe has been too self-centered and that an enlightened response has been too slow in coming. But, given the many bells that are ringing today, there is really no reason why the next generation of Europeans will not be able to overcome the challenge of Asia’s relative rise.
I must admit that the idea that an erstwhile dominant Europe might be anxious today is more interesting than the story of China rising after long periods of disorder and uncertainty. Should Europe be anxious? Where does such anxiety come from? Many writers have touched on the changing relativities in global affairs, but why should that lead to anxiety? And how do these questions relate to China? Let me say straightaway that I am puzzled why European anxieties should have anything to do with rising Asia. I am even more skeptical of the exaggerated accounts of what rising China can do to the world. Nevertheless, I am aware that there is a China effect in global perceptions today, and rising China is the source of anxiety in some places, for example, among some of China’s immediate neighbors and even among some groups in the USA as a Pacific power. Of course, it is not China alone that is rising. But, reading the discourse between the lines, much of the ongoing discussion about rising Asia is really about China’s remarkable development during the past three decades. Somehow, the rise of other countries could actually be welcome, but it is China’s rise that has become the cause for anxiety.
The idea that Europe may be anxious is indeed intriguing. Looking over its recent history, I would have thought that Europe could not have been more anxious than when, after the Second World War, most of the continent was devastated by destruction and loss of life. And, when its imperial states had to withdraw from their colonies in Asia and Africa to become mere nation-states, the decline from their previous positions of power and wealth must have been painful. Europe’s dominant place in the world was replaced by two upstart superpowers, the USA west across the Atlantic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) overland to the east. During their so-called Cold War, Western Europe was forced to lean towards the USA while the eastern half of the continent had little choice but go with the USSR. Major decisions in global affairs were no longer in European hands. Under those circumstances, the leaders of each of the European states would have had good reason to be anxious about their respective country’s future. But, as I understand it, they seemed not to have been, at least not for long.
The continent recovered well from the damage done by the war, especially its Western half. European leaders were bold and innovative in creating a larger regional community, something few thought much of when it was first mooted. Today, that community is moving towards a potentially powerful union. Who in 1945 would have thought that this could be done? Living standards among Europeans soon
As a historian, I am constantly reminded that young Chinese at the start of the twentieth century were terribly anxious when they found that the European Great Powers were miles ahead of them in almost every field of development and realized that they had a long way to go to catch up. Many panicked and sought to revive the country in drastic ways, through rebellion, revolution, and even the total rejection of their own past. Compared to that response, Europe’s awareness of what Asia is seeking to achieve is timely and, it seems to me, the remedies are much simpler and decidedly doable. Some might think that Europe has been too self-centered and that an enlightened response has been too slow in coming. But, given the many bells that are ringing today, there is really no reason why the next generation of Europeans will not be able to overcome the challenge of Asia’s relative rise.
I must admit that the idea that an erstwhile dominant Europe might be anxious today is more interesting than the story of China rising after long periods of disorder and uncertainty. Should Europe be anxious? Where does such anxiety come from? Many writers have touched on the changing relativities in global affairs, but why should that lead to anxiety? And how do these questions relate to China? Let me say straightaway that I am puzzled why European anxieties should have anything to do with rising Asia. I am even more skeptical of the exaggerated accounts of what rising China can do to the world. Nevertheless, I am aware that there is a China effect in global perceptions today, and rising China is the source of anxiety in some places, for example, among some of China’s immediate neighbors and even among some groups in the USA as a Pacific power. Of course, it is not China alone that is rising. But, reading the discourse between the lines, much of the ongoing discussion about rising Asia is really about China’s remarkable development during the past three decades. Somehow, the rise of other countries could actually be welcome, but it is China’s rise that has become the cause for anxiety.
The idea that Europe may be anxious is indeed intriguing. Looking over its recent history, I would have thought that Europe could not have been more anxious than when, after the Second World War, most of the continent was devastated by destruction and loss of life. And, when its imperial states had to withdraw from their colonies in Asia and Africa to become mere nation-states, the decline from their previous positions of power and wealth must have been painful. Europe’s dominant place in the world was replaced by two upstart superpowers, the USA west across the Atlantic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) overland to the east. During their so-called Cold War, Western Europe was forced to lean towards the USA while the eastern half of the continent had little choice but go with the USSR. Major decisions in global affairs were no longer in European hands. Under those circumstances, the leaders of each of the European states would have had good reason to be anxious about their respective country’s future. But, as I understand it, they seemed not to have been, at least not for long.
The continent recovered well from the damage done by the war, especially its Western half. European leaders were bold and innovative in creating a larger regional community, something few thought much of when it was first mooted. Today, that community is moving towards a potentially powerful union. Who in 1945 would have thought that this could be done? Living standards among Europeans soon
The China effect in anxious Europe 337
became among the highest in the world and the quality of life of those who are
employed has been the envy of just about everyone. It was breathtaking what the old
nation-states of Europe have been experimenting with. Today, the EU model has
gained well-deserved attention, not least among the national leaders in Southeast Asia
who are trying to establish a strong regional Association of Southeast Asian States.
In short, what anxiety there was quickly turned to pride and renewed confidence. How Europe recovered was remarkable. And, after the Cold War was over and the West was triumphant, the promised golden era of capitalism seemed to have arrived. The economies of both Europe and America grew at a great pace and their growth was stopped only by the dramatic downturn of late 2008 in New York and then by the crisis of the Euro in 2011. Does this mean that anxious Europe is something that is only a few years old? Is this something temporary or is there a feeling that this stoppage portends more fundamental shifts in global power and wealth?
One might ask, what is really new? The following three factors in global affairs loom large. New technologies have speeded up the rate of change and information dissemination. This creates great volatility in markets and public opinion that is difficult to predict or control. Can older political structures cope with such changes?
Secondly, the modern post-Enlightenment faith in continuous economic growth and having a larger pie fairly shared among the needy has been undermined. Will a minority of the rich get richer and most other people poorer? Is the mixed economy model that Europe had pioneered now seriously threatened? Will the majority now want a total overhaul of the social and political system?
Thirdly, the hope that the USA as the sole superpower since the 1990s might make the world a better and safer place can no longer be taken for granted. In particular, some problems in Asia are not amenable to American solutions; some might even become potential challenges to American supremacy. This is certainly something for the USA to be concerned about. But, should Europe be anxious about American reactions to changes in the Asia-Pacific region?
The first two factors affect every corner of the world. They are not the sources of the China effect and do not have a direct bearing on what China is doing. Indeed, China faces even more difficult problems than Europe, for example, the spread of the latest communications technologies, and the innovative ways its people are making use of them, have increasingly taxed the Chinese state’s resources. Also, the growing tensions between the nouveau riche and the struggling poor in China are endangering social stability. In comparison, such tensions in Europe look manageable. It also cannot be shown that China is in any way rising at the expense of Europe. I am thus led to conclude that neither of the two factors is significant as a source for European anxiety.
There is, however, one area that may be arousing some concern. This can be found in the zero-sum framework that pervades the study of political and military power. Here, relativities do matter a great deal. In that framework, American reactions to China’s rise can be globally significant. If the mood in the USA should reach the point when the majority feels that the country faces relative decline, and this is matched by the expectation that China will become the superpower to challenge US supremacy, there would be reason for Americans to be anxious. That could then be a factor relevant to current debates about an anxious Europe.
It is remarkable how, during the past half century, European attitudes have come to be seen as paralleling those in the USA. The European and American economies have
In short, what anxiety there was quickly turned to pride and renewed confidence. How Europe recovered was remarkable. And, after the Cold War was over and the West was triumphant, the promised golden era of capitalism seemed to have arrived. The economies of both Europe and America grew at a great pace and their growth was stopped only by the dramatic downturn of late 2008 in New York and then by the crisis of the Euro in 2011. Does this mean that anxious Europe is something that is only a few years old? Is this something temporary or is there a feeling that this stoppage portends more fundamental shifts in global power and wealth?
One might ask, what is really new? The following three factors in global affairs loom large. New technologies have speeded up the rate of change and information dissemination. This creates great volatility in markets and public opinion that is difficult to predict or control. Can older political structures cope with such changes?
Secondly, the modern post-Enlightenment faith in continuous economic growth and having a larger pie fairly shared among the needy has been undermined. Will a minority of the rich get richer and most other people poorer? Is the mixed economy model that Europe had pioneered now seriously threatened? Will the majority now want a total overhaul of the social and political system?
Thirdly, the hope that the USA as the sole superpower since the 1990s might make the world a better and safer place can no longer be taken for granted. In particular, some problems in Asia are not amenable to American solutions; some might even become potential challenges to American supremacy. This is certainly something for the USA to be concerned about. But, should Europe be anxious about American reactions to changes in the Asia-Pacific region?
The first two factors affect every corner of the world. They are not the sources of the China effect and do not have a direct bearing on what China is doing. Indeed, China faces even more difficult problems than Europe, for example, the spread of the latest communications technologies, and the innovative ways its people are making use of them, have increasingly taxed the Chinese state’s resources. Also, the growing tensions between the nouveau riche and the struggling poor in China are endangering social stability. In comparison, such tensions in Europe look manageable. It also cannot be shown that China is in any way rising at the expense of Europe. I am thus led to conclude that neither of the two factors is significant as a source for European anxiety.
There is, however, one area that may be arousing some concern. This can be found in the zero-sum framework that pervades the study of political and military power. Here, relativities do matter a great deal. In that framework, American reactions to China’s rise can be globally significant. If the mood in the USA should reach the point when the majority feels that the country faces relative decline, and this is matched by the expectation that China will become the superpower to challenge US supremacy, there would be reason for Americans to be anxious. That could then be a factor relevant to current debates about an anxious Europe.
It is remarkable how, during the past half century, European attitudes have come to be seen as paralleling those in the USA. The European and American economies have
338 G. Wang
done very well together. This includes the financial and service sectors where parts of
Europe have sought to follow American practices and policies. It partly explains how
the financial crisis that began in the USA in late 2008 directly affected most countries
in Europe. Overnight, both sides of the Atlantic seem to have felt the same pain,
although some countries felt it more immediately than others.
For me, this shows how closely much of Europe is now integrated with the USA. It is particularly apparent in the areas of defense and security where American protec- tion, originally against the Soviet Union through North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other institutions, had become the norm. Even though there are people in Europe who rail against this dependence, that high degree of integration is manifest on the ground and in the air. For example, in 2011, the Europeans might not have acted as one when Britain and France actively intervened in Libya, but the reassuring shadow of USA backing was always crucial. And the same applies to many of the decisions pertaining to the Middle East where Europeans have been America’s indispensable allies. They seem to share the same anxiety when faced with a region that, unlike the last two centuries, now defiantly resists Western influence.
In economic and social areas, integration may be less obvious. There are residual ideological differences about welfare provisions and the role of the public sector. But Europeans have important shared philosophical and cultural values with Americans that impinge on European lives and guide their habits of thought. Europe may still look older and wiser but, after decades of dependence on American support, the majority of its peoples would not want to do without American protection and leadership. In that context, it is easy to understand why increasingly most Europeans are quick to respond as Americans do. Thus, if the Americans are anxious about China rising and, therefore, decide to shift their defense focus to the Asia-Pacific, one can expect many Europeans to feel a similar concern. Some might even feel that, if this causes a slippage in American care and attention, there is even more reason to be anxious.
In short, European anxiety has little to do with Europe’s own relations with China. However, the close Europe–USA relationship suggests that, for the source of Europe’s anxiety, one has to take USA thinking about China into consideration. But as we are not gathered here to talk about the USA, I shall leave aside for another time the question of why the USA should worry about China.
Let me now turn to the China effect. In 2004, I published a paper describing the present phenomenon as the fourth rise of China. I identified the first as the Qin–Han unification 2,000 years ago, the second as the emergence of the Tang dynasty in the seventh century and the third after the Ming Chinese recovered from Mongol conquest at the end of the fourteenth century. The fourth rise at the end of the twentieth century had one thing in common with the others. It came after China had been overwhelmed by massive changes to state and society.
This rise has been a long time coming and is at the heart of the story of modern China. All the facts are well known, but the wider context in Asia deserves a closer look. Since the end of the Second World War in 1945, many leaders of former colonies were cheered that their countries were decolonized, but they shared some of the anxieties felt by Europeans when their new states were also expected to choose between two super- powers, the USA and the Soviet Union. One European scholar known for his Marxist views who understood modern European history very well was the Dutch historian, Jan Romein. His book, first published in 1956, on the century of Asian history was not
For me, this shows how closely much of Europe is now integrated with the USA. It is particularly apparent in the areas of defense and security where American protec- tion, originally against the Soviet Union through North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other institutions, had become the norm. Even though there are people in Europe who rail against this dependence, that high degree of integration is manifest on the ground and in the air. For example, in 2011, the Europeans might not have acted as one when Britain and France actively intervened in Libya, but the reassuring shadow of USA backing was always crucial. And the same applies to many of the decisions pertaining to the Middle East where Europeans have been America’s indispensable allies. They seem to share the same anxiety when faced with a region that, unlike the last two centuries, now defiantly resists Western influence.
In economic and social areas, integration may be less obvious. There are residual ideological differences about welfare provisions and the role of the public sector. But Europeans have important shared philosophical and cultural values with Americans that impinge on European lives and guide their habits of thought. Europe may still look older and wiser but, after decades of dependence on American support, the majority of its peoples would not want to do without American protection and leadership. In that context, it is easy to understand why increasingly most Europeans are quick to respond as Americans do. Thus, if the Americans are anxious about China rising and, therefore, decide to shift their defense focus to the Asia-Pacific, one can expect many Europeans to feel a similar concern. Some might even feel that, if this causes a slippage in American care and attention, there is even more reason to be anxious.
In short, European anxiety has little to do with Europe’s own relations with China. However, the close Europe–USA relationship suggests that, for the source of Europe’s anxiety, one has to take USA thinking about China into consideration. But as we are not gathered here to talk about the USA, I shall leave aside for another time the question of why the USA should worry about China.
Let me now turn to the China effect. In 2004, I published a paper describing the present phenomenon as the fourth rise of China. I identified the first as the Qin–Han unification 2,000 years ago, the second as the emergence of the Tang dynasty in the seventh century and the third after the Ming Chinese recovered from Mongol conquest at the end of the fourteenth century. The fourth rise at the end of the twentieth century had one thing in common with the others. It came after China had been overwhelmed by massive changes to state and society.
This rise has been a long time coming and is at the heart of the story of modern China. All the facts are well known, but the wider context in Asia deserves a closer look. Since the end of the Second World War in 1945, many leaders of former colonies were cheered that their countries were decolonized, but they shared some of the anxieties felt by Europeans when their new states were also expected to choose between two super- powers, the USA and the Soviet Union. One European scholar known for his Marxist views who understood modern European history very well was the Dutch historian, Jan Romein. His book, first published in 1956, on the century of Asian history was not
The China effect in anxious Europe 339
flattering to Asian institutions but it was one of the first to alert Europeans to the
potential of countries that were newly free from foreign rule. One of his students was
a friend and he confirmed that Jan Romein was not anxious about Asia rising but more
about Europe recovering from its many wars. Reading his and other European reports
about developments in Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, there was no reason to expect Asia
to rise and be a source of concern. However, after experiencing decades of turmoil, the
world today is no longer surprised that Asia is rising and that China is leading the way.
We should not be surprised about China’s capacity to rise. Its island neighbor, Japan, a country that has mastered what a powerful imperial China had to offer, turned away from Chinese civilization when it discovered that Europe was stronger and richer. That led to its spectacular rise at the end of the nineteenth century. Despite the big dip between the 1940s and 1950s as a consequence of the Pacific War, Japan has been rising ever since. Clearly, that rise had been a real source of anxiety for all other Powers. Indeed, it led Japan quickly to war, first with China and Russia, and then again with China until it attacked the USA and its European allies in 1941.
Recalling those episodes today has made many strategic thinkers pause. It is unlikely to lead Japan to war again because lessons have been painfully learnt, although there are some who would not altogether rule out that possibility. But what about China? Here we come to the nub of the current manifestations of anxiety. The idea that China has the capacity to rise to the same heights as imperial Japan does exercise the minds of many American strategists. America’s allies located closer to China are also troubled and, apart from those with their own political agendas, some of them are even encouraged by their American friends to worry even more. And there is evidence that many Europeans, for various different reasons, share some of that anxiety.
This has much to do with the speed of Chinese development, with how surprised most people are by the Chinese Communist Party leaders’ ability to adapt their centralist political structures to capitalist methods of economic growth. Until the very end of the twentieth century, few would have expected China to rise so quickly. After all, China was for more than a century divided by rebellions, invasions, civil wars, and revolutions. At several points before 1945, many in China thought the country was mortally weakened and its ancient civilization totally submerged.
When the People’s Republic was established over 60 years ago, it turned to the Soviet Union for help and was expected to remain a satellite of the Soviet empire. Because of that, Maoist China was seen as dangerous to the interests of the USA and its allies. But when Mao Zedong spun off his own brand of revolutionary zeal, it actually provided the wedge that ultimately helped the USA to undermine the larger Soviet threat. When Mao died, most people were grateful that Deng Xiaoping closed that book and opened another, one that concentrated on creating a peaceful environ- ment for economic development. In this new book, China opened its doors to the global market and learnt directly from America and Europe, as well as from its immediate East Asian neighbours. The successes are now obvious. Both the Chinese peoples and consumers of manufactured goods everywhere have benefited from that rapid growth. Can this China effect, product of an extraordinary success story, be the source of anxiety among Americans, Europeans and China’s neighbours?
The sources are indeed complex. On the surface, the 2008 recession in the USA and Europe has highlighted the fact that China, and some other parts of Asia, weathered that shock well. China’s economy continued to grow and the idea that this
We should not be surprised about China’s capacity to rise. Its island neighbor, Japan, a country that has mastered what a powerful imperial China had to offer, turned away from Chinese civilization when it discovered that Europe was stronger and richer. That led to its spectacular rise at the end of the nineteenth century. Despite the big dip between the 1940s and 1950s as a consequence of the Pacific War, Japan has been rising ever since. Clearly, that rise had been a real source of anxiety for all other Powers. Indeed, it led Japan quickly to war, first with China and Russia, and then again with China until it attacked the USA and its European allies in 1941.
Recalling those episodes today has made many strategic thinkers pause. It is unlikely to lead Japan to war again because lessons have been painfully learnt, although there are some who would not altogether rule out that possibility. But what about China? Here we come to the nub of the current manifestations of anxiety. The idea that China has the capacity to rise to the same heights as imperial Japan does exercise the minds of many American strategists. America’s allies located closer to China are also troubled and, apart from those with their own political agendas, some of them are even encouraged by their American friends to worry even more. And there is evidence that many Europeans, for various different reasons, share some of that anxiety.
This has much to do with the speed of Chinese development, with how surprised most people are by the Chinese Communist Party leaders’ ability to adapt their centralist political structures to capitalist methods of economic growth. Until the very end of the twentieth century, few would have expected China to rise so quickly. After all, China was for more than a century divided by rebellions, invasions, civil wars, and revolutions. At several points before 1945, many in China thought the country was mortally weakened and its ancient civilization totally submerged.
When the People’s Republic was established over 60 years ago, it turned to the Soviet Union for help and was expected to remain a satellite of the Soviet empire. Because of that, Maoist China was seen as dangerous to the interests of the USA and its allies. But when Mao Zedong spun off his own brand of revolutionary zeal, it actually provided the wedge that ultimately helped the USA to undermine the larger Soviet threat. When Mao died, most people were grateful that Deng Xiaoping closed that book and opened another, one that concentrated on creating a peaceful environ- ment for economic development. In this new book, China opened its doors to the global market and learnt directly from America and Europe, as well as from its immediate East Asian neighbours. The successes are now obvious. Both the Chinese peoples and consumers of manufactured goods everywhere have benefited from that rapid growth. Can this China effect, product of an extraordinary success story, be the source of anxiety among Americans, Europeans and China’s neighbours?
The sources are indeed complex. On the surface, the 2008 recession in the USA and Europe has highlighted the fact that China, and some other parts of Asia, weathered that shock well. China’s economy continued to grow and the idea that this
340 G. Wang
kind of state-driven resilience can successfully withstand the uncertainties of the
capitalist system has attracted a great deal of attention. In particular, some of those
countries that have been trying to follow different European models of development
are thinking again. How exactly will China’s success impact on the ideals of
economic liberalization and the virtues of private enterprise? The question is no
longer academic but has become a subject of practical interest.
The China effect also takes other forms, mostly not of China’s doing. When the Euro countries encountered a series of interconnected problems that look intractable, there followed many stories of European countries looking to China for help. Justified or not, such stories can only be misleading. China is in no position to help the developed countries of Europe, but starring in so many headlines and feature articles in the international and national media has contributed greatly to raising false hopes and generating anxiety. That has certainly raised concerns about how China will wield its newfound economic influence.
At another level, debates within China have added another dimension to the China effect. This has come largely from recent US strategic decisions in West and Central Asia. As a result of failures there, the follow-up decisions about moving America’s strategic focus to Northeast and Southeast Asia, and the Pacific region in general, has opened up new debates in China. At their heart is the question of how China should respond to this open and deliberate shift of attention. In particular, the calls for a reappraisal of Deng Xiaoping’s injunction to concentrate on China’s own economic development and not to engage actively in foreign adventures have become louder. In that context, the steady growth in military expenditures and more strident voices in the blogosphere, with the People’s Liberation Army seeking a bigger role in national politics, have all aroused intense attention. But is China’s response the cause for anxiety? Or does the anxiety come mainly from those who hoped that the USA would always be the sole superpower dedicated to moving the world towards its version of modern civilization?
I cannot close without at least mentioning that the Chinese people have reason to be anxious too. It might be relevant, possibly even useful, for young Europeans to find out what worries their counterparts in China. Of course, the scale is different. It is not only the numbers of people involved. There are also the complexities of a highly centralized system that is also necessarily decentralized in order to produce the growth it has achieved. How will such a system cope with the pressures coming from its very successes? Given the range of discrepancies that mark the distribution of wealth and power in China, what can the young hope for? Their fathers and grand- fathers learnt a lot from the West. Should they also go on doing the same for the rest of the 21st century? But, if Europe is anxious, where can they turn?
Many Chinese intellectual leaders are now asking that the country look to its own cultural roots to find the moral compass that many young people today find missing from their lives. Some have pointed to the fact that the young in Europe are anchored by their faith in the fundamental values that had made Europe great. That is a very important lesson for China today. As long as the Chinese people still have faith in their history and culture, any kind of anxiety becomes manageable. If young Chinese can recover the inner force that had propelled their earlier leaders to rebuild China from the ruins of wars and invasions, that is the China effect that deserves more attention from young Europeans. Perhaps they could then be convinced that there is no reason for them to be anxious at all.
The China effect also takes other forms, mostly not of China’s doing. When the Euro countries encountered a series of interconnected problems that look intractable, there followed many stories of European countries looking to China for help. Justified or not, such stories can only be misleading. China is in no position to help the developed countries of Europe, but starring in so many headlines and feature articles in the international and national media has contributed greatly to raising false hopes and generating anxiety. That has certainly raised concerns about how China will wield its newfound economic influence.
At another level, debates within China have added another dimension to the China effect. This has come largely from recent US strategic decisions in West and Central Asia. As a result of failures there, the follow-up decisions about moving America’s strategic focus to Northeast and Southeast Asia, and the Pacific region in general, has opened up new debates in China. At their heart is the question of how China should respond to this open and deliberate shift of attention. In particular, the calls for a reappraisal of Deng Xiaoping’s injunction to concentrate on China’s own economic development and not to engage actively in foreign adventures have become louder. In that context, the steady growth in military expenditures and more strident voices in the blogosphere, with the People’s Liberation Army seeking a bigger role in national politics, have all aroused intense attention. But is China’s response the cause for anxiety? Or does the anxiety come mainly from those who hoped that the USA would always be the sole superpower dedicated to moving the world towards its version of modern civilization?
I cannot close without at least mentioning that the Chinese people have reason to be anxious too. It might be relevant, possibly even useful, for young Europeans to find out what worries their counterparts in China. Of course, the scale is different. It is not only the numbers of people involved. There are also the complexities of a highly centralized system that is also necessarily decentralized in order to produce the growth it has achieved. How will such a system cope with the pressures coming from its very successes? Given the range of discrepancies that mark the distribution of wealth and power in China, what can the young hope for? Their fathers and grand- fathers learnt a lot from the West. Should they also go on doing the same for the rest of the 21st century? But, if Europe is anxious, where can they turn?
Many Chinese intellectual leaders are now asking that the country look to its own cultural roots to find the moral compass that many young people today find missing from their lives. Some have pointed to the fact that the young in Europe are anchored by their faith in the fundamental values that had made Europe great. That is a very important lesson for China today. As long as the Chinese people still have faith in their history and culture, any kind of anxiety becomes manageable. If young Chinese can recover the inner force that had propelled their earlier leaders to rebuild China from the ruins of wars and invasions, that is the China effect that deserves more attention from young Europeans. Perhaps they could then be convinced that there is no reason for them to be anxious at all.
